In a stalled condition, the nose of every conventional aircraft falls toward mother earth. This is physics and happens every time. And the natural human reaction is to pull back away from the ground making the control situation worse. Only high-quality flight training, both initial and recurrent, can overcome this deep human reaction of “panic and pull.” Education in the classroom yields understanding, but training on the controls in flight is necessary to build deep, reliable, and correct habits.
New pilots must be patiently taught the feel of slow flight and the correct reaction to an excessive angle of attack and full stalls. It is necessary to train deeply here and to slowly overcome the initial fear. It takes time and persistence to reach a level of comfort and control in high AOA flight. Our fatal accident statistics still demonstrate that we all need better initial education and more current repetition and review; Loss of Control Inflight (LOC-I) is the #1 pilot killer.
Unfortunately, especially in larger airframes, pilots were taught for years to “power out of the stalls.” Even if initial training was accurate, many years of “negative stall training” overwrites habits. Historically there was very little emphasis on reducing the angle of attack in larger, powerful aircraft. Instead, the emphasis was on preventing altitude loss. The FAA recently added “Expanded Envelope Training“ to the 121 regulations for every airline pilot recurrency. And the new ATP ACS puts a clear emphasis on reducing the angle of attack for stall recovery. But this may be “too little and too late” for many veteran pilots who experienced and reinforced “negative stall training” for so many years.
During my recent recurrent training in Florida, I witnessed a very experienced (though somewhat rusty) pilot attempt to recover an intentional stall with power and no reduction in angle of attack. This was shocking but eye-opening for me. He panicked, fought the controls, and eventually put the large jet simulator into the (virtual) ground. This was identical to the mishandling that resulted in the landmark accident of Colgan 3407. Negative initial stall training is very persistent and hidden away in our deepest habits. One important purpose of recurrent flight training is to discover, correct, and retrain these very deep habits we all depend on as pilots. Accurate habits must be immediately available or our lives are at risk in an upset situation.
Proper stall recovery training requires time and patience. Complete and thorough stall recovery training is seldom included in our current accelerated flight training environment. It is also the professional responsibility of every CFI to not only train correctly but also to create safe and complete pilots beyond the minimum ACS requirements. Many important skills are not required in the ACS test and are consequently not taught. The FAA puts its trust in professional educators here. Eradicating deeply embedded “negative stall training” takes even longer. Panic and pulling, combined with incomplete understanding, are the root problems behind many pilot deaths. Releasing and unloading in a panic situation is a trained and very unnatural response.
Various versions of the FAA ACS initially allowed stall recovery “at the first indication” of a stall. Consequently, many recent pilots (and even CFIs) have never experienced, or gotten comfortable with, full stalls. These pilots often panic when full stalls are requested for higher-level certificates. Old-school flight training often included ballistic “falling leaf” stall recoveries during flight training, teaching rudder usage and demonstrating control of the nose-low stalled condition. Every pilot can benefit from this “extended training!”
Every pilot (and especially CFIs) should invest the time to take Rich Stowell’s FREE Learn-To-Turn Course. Then put these ideas to use with a good instructor practicing SAFE’s Extended Envelope Training. This builds comfort and correct control during high AOA flight conditions. Until the unload instinct overwrites “panic and pull” you are not a safe pilot. Safety requires expanding your flight envelope and training out of your comfort zone. Build correct and reliable habits; fly safely out there (and often).
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Currently, 2/3rds of “active CFIs” have taught for less than a year and often only have 5 hours of real solo time. Consequently, there is no real experience or wisdom to impart to a new learner. Current flight training needs more of this “wisdom and experience” injected to increase the level of flight training safety and efficiency. This is exactly what 
At accelerated schools, there is no time to master and solidify the aviation skills learned at the private, instrument, and commercial levels. Once the required FAA test minimums are met, these hard-won skills and knowledge rapidly become stale and are often forgotten (never reinforced or improved). Ask an instrument applicant about the significance of E/G airspace and the implication for IFR safety on approach to a non-towered airport; crickets! “That is private-pilot-level knowledge,” and already gone. With accelerated training, each discrete skill set is abandoned as soon as it’s completed and it’s off to the new challenges. As a result, the instructional cadre demonstrates limited skill and real-world experience. Many essential skills are missed because of this repeating “cycle of beginners.” 
The FAA’s Weather Camera Program 
I flew with a friend in a C-210 up the Alcan to Fairbanks and toured Central Alaska. Transiting to Anchorage through Windy Pass with a stop in Talkeetna really runs you through some challenging weather and terrain; these cameras are a lifesaver.
Yup, most pilots have some distress here…just mention “back pain” with any high-time pilot and you will probably get an earful about fused and removed discs, or stories of continuing misery and medication. “Lots of hours” means lots of sitting – the “new smoking” – and this often results in back pain issues. (Even athletes with regular exercise routines often miss the real source of “pilot back pain.”)
Productive learning requires a positive attitude toward all these less-than-perfect first attempts. Any whole-hearted effort in a positive direction is a “learning opportunity” if it is carefully reviewed and analyzed. But we humans tend to erroneously only celebrate ultimate success and ignore the value of “failures.” Think of how many more setbacks there will be to becoming an “interplanetary species.”
There are 
Machines have no ego problems that slow down (or prevent) error correction. They don’t make excuses to hide their mistakes. Honestly admitting, “oops, I was wrong,” is the first and most essential step in learning and improvement – recognition and acceptance. Computers don’t worry about their social image and what their friends will think. Instead, computers aggressively recalibrate their learning and have consequently surpassed humans in many areas. Error correction should not be an embarrassment or aberration, it is an expected and valuable part of all growth.
The accurate reflection part- 
Every properly prepared pilot can fly safely, even with a minimum level of skill, *IF* they accurately match their skills to the real demands of each mission. (That’s why CFIs can impose “limitations” on solo endorsements). In the vernacular, we are safe if we “don’t write checks we can’t cash.” The central problem, however, is the impossibility of accurately and objectively determining the two sides of this equation (see graphic above). Just about every pilot overrates their own skills and also underappreciates the threats they face. We inadvertently close that safety margin with our flawed analysis of both risks and skills. This is something I call “
To be safe we must accurately assess our real pilot skills and compare those to an equally accurate analysis of the demands of the flight. If an objective and honest analysis were actually available, maintaining safety becomes a simple physics problem; just maintain a margin of safety. Unfortunately, we are usually only capable of honest assessment during “20/20 hindsight.” (The “error correction” only arrives by virtue of a crash). Most often when we examine accidents in retrospect we end up puzzling “what were they thinking?”
numerous cognitive biases. As a funny example, 93% of American drivers think they are “better than average.” This impossible statistic is humorous in “Lake Wobegone” where “all the children are above average,” but very dangerous when we assess our personal capabilities in a high-consequence activity like flying. Most pilots rate their abilities much too highly. They look in the mirror and see Chuck Yaeger staring back at them.
Similarly, when we assess the seemingly objective flight risks of weather, terrain, and workload, we exhibit confirmation bias; we “see what we want to see.” Another side of this problem is erroneously assuming the challenges are fixed and linear. But the weather, wind, and workload change continuously and require different levels of skill throughout each flight. Some of the highest workload requirements occur just when fatigue is diminishing our skill and knowledge capabilities; narrowing the safety margin.
To accurately analyze “the safety margin” and maintain a comfortable “gap” of residual capability, every pilot should assume the worst level of weather; the highest challenge. Assuming minimal pilot capability is also wise since self-assessments are usually optimistic. In short, don’t try to be a hero and over-commit to a flight at the limits of your perceived capability; these walls are permeable. Flight planning with past successes (which may be only luck) can put any pilot in an unworkable “coffin corner.”
As pilots, we are trained from day one to identify and mitigate risks. Unfortunately, most serious threats do not “self-announce!” 
Our average GA plane is about 50 years old, and as CFIs we are especially vulnerable to CO since we swap from one plane to another continuously (they might be quietly trying to kill you). Since I have been wearing these new Lightspeed Delta Zulu headsets, I have found three planes with a toxic levels of poison gas. The client/pilots always point to their (state-of-the-art) plastic spot monitoring system (a $4 device?). They confidently believe they are safe. Wow, what a wake-up call for this CFI/DPE. Please consider active monoxide monitoring for safety (this muffler heating system was outlawed in automobiles years ago). Lightspeed Aviation is collecting (and anonymizing) data from users and the preliminary results are already shocking; many planes seem to be leaking poison gas into the cockpit (early data). I strongly suggest you actively monitor the CO levels in every plane you fly.
Takeoff and initial climb are very simple operations in most GA planes. But surprisingly, this area of flight is 
Pilots are usually in their “happy place” during takeoff, doing what they love. There is not much challenge – or awareness – on the usual takeoff. Adding intentionality and awareness to our preparation and takeoff is a simple (but necessary) step that creates a much safer flight.
If you remember your first flights, fear is the most common reaction during early take-off experiences. Those early takeoffs are terrifying for most people. Every experienced CFI is familiar with that sweating blank look in the left seat. A new pilot-in-learning is unfortunately often “Code Red” during the first few takeoffs and only starts breathing again at pattern altitude. In this state, the human senses are narrowed with fear, and learners neither see nor retain/understand very much from these first few experiences (
