Aviation Ideas and Discussion!

There are many ways to analyze accidents. One of those is to try to mentally put yourself in the place of the pilot at different stages of the flight, from flight planning through the end of the accident sequence. Part of that is to imagine the pilot’s state of mind as the situation deteriorates so that you can try to formulate actions that might have saved the day.

I can imagine that in many, if not most cases, at least for a fleeting moment, the pilot asks the rhetorical question, “What am I doing here?” Obviously, that is not a strategy to avoid the accident at that point, but it is helpful for us to study the accident and ask, “How did the pilot get into that situation.”

We know about the error chain and that usually a series of errors, rather than a single mistake, leads up to a crash. We also know that if the error chain had been broken somewhere along the way, the accident might have been avoided. So let’s look at some risk factors, commonly found as links in error chains, that we might be able to mitigate. Usually more than one of these risk factors work together or in sequence to answer our question, “How did the pilot get into that situation.” These are not presented in a particular order because they can all range from a minor, contributing factor to a major causal factor.

Proficiency  Pilots need to be proficient for any operations they might reasonably have to perform. The lower the pilot’s capability curve the lower the margin of safety. Of course capability must be measured against the task load for the particular operation. The pilot who always operates a Cessna 172 from a 6,000 foot paved runway with no obstacles at either end, has little need to practice short or soft field operations from a 1,500 foot turf runway with trees at each end. That might be true except when something does not go as planned. Unexpected adverse weather, or a mechanical problem might necessitate an unplanned landing at, guess what, the 1,500 foot turf runway with trees at each end.

But there are areas in which a pilot might not need to maintain proficiency providing there is no chance that the particular skill will be needed. An example might be the professional pilot who is multiengine rated but is retired and only flies single engine airplanes. There is no need to be proficient in multiengine, engine-out operations providing the pilot has the resolve to stay with just single engine airplanes. A common problem befalls the non-current, non-proficient instrument rated pilot. Needing to get home to go to work with IFR conditions and access to an IFR equipped airplane often provides too much temptation to think, “It will be OK just this once.”

Aircraft Maintenance The first link in the error chain often is put in place long before the flight occurs and sometimes that involves aircraft maintenance. An inflight mechanical problem, can range from catastrophic such as a control failure to a minor one such as the loss of an alternator during day VFR flight. But even a minor mechanical problem, increases the pilot’s task load and thereby decreases the safety margin. A well-maintained aircraft does not eliminate the possibility of a mechanical problem inflight, but it reduces the probability.

Fatigue Just about every high-stakes or mission-critical industry has come to recognize the risk posed by a fatigued operator. Of course that includes pilots. Fatigue is common in our society and of course varies in severity. The FAA has determined that being awake for 17 hours has the same effect on performance as having a blood alcohol level in the 0.05 to 0.10 range. The only way to reduce fatigue is to sleep. So the pilot who is otherwise very proficient and fit to fly, but who has been up most of the night, perhaps with an ill child, works a long day, then embarks on a long, cross country flight is adding a link to the error chain. That pilot will have decreased capability and therefore the a reduced margin of safety.

Impairment  Most pilots are well aware of risk of flying after consuming alcohol and refrain from doing so. Most pilots do not use illicit drugs and those who do mostly do not fly while they are under the influence. Unfortunately, we are seeing more cases of impairing, illicit drugs in toxicology reports of fatal accident pilots.  But many pilots are actively flying while being unknowingly impaired. That impairment comes from a variety of prescription and over-the-counter medications. Space here does not permit a detailed discussion, but a general rule that works most of the time is to read the label and ask a pharmacist. If the label says not to drive or operate machinery, that should be a big red flag. Interactions are also a factor, and that is where advice from a pharmacist comes into play. Any degree of impairment reduces capability and therefore the safety margin. Impaired flying presents a big link in the error chain.

External Factors In the human factors world we call this pressure. It is simply something that causes us to press the envelope and go into a situation which is ill-advised. External factors often add the deciding link to the error chain. Common sources of this pressure are a need to conduct a flight to get back to work the next day, provide a promised flight to another person, attend an important meeting, get a child back to college for exams, and many more. Our cognitive biases work on our unconscious mind to make us believe that the risks are lower than they really are.

Of course there are more of these factors and more possible scenarios for each. Below are links to a couple of accidents in the Accident Analysis section. Read through them and see if you can apply some of the factors above to determine how the error chain developed. Try to answer the question, “How did the pilot get into that situation.”

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles and also write us a comment if you see a problem (or want to contribute an article). We always need more input on aviation excellence or flight safety. There are many highly qualified SAFE members out there! If you are not yet a member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun.

Much attention is given to the prominent accidental causal factors such as thunderstorms, structural icing, midair collision, pilot impairment, and the like. But often a seemingly minor item can begin an error chain that ends poorly.

We have all heard the axiom regarding new pilots. It states that a pilot begins with a full bucket of luck and an empty bucket of experience. The challenge is to sufficiently fill the bucket of experience before the bucket of luck is emptied. I have written before about how that most certainly applied to me when I was a new flight instructor many, many years ago. One of those transactions of trading luck for experience taught me a lesson regarding one of those “little things.”

It was a clear, dark, cold winter night and I was taking a primary student out for his third and final night lesson before sending him for his private pilot checkride. We ordered fuel for the Cessna 172 and waited inside for the line person to complete the fueling process. I then sent my student out to perform the preflight inspection while I enjoyed the CFI’s prerogative of waiting in the comfy and warm FBO. The student signaled that he was ready so I went out, strapped myself in, and we were off for our flight. The student performed all of his procedures very well and we lifted off into the moonless, but star-filled night sky. I had instructed the student to perform a short field takeoff which he did quite well. Passing about 70 feet AGL he lowered the nose slightly to accelerate from Vx to Vy. A few seconds later we were beyond the airport boundary, over sparsely populated agricultural land, and to quote one of my favorite expressions, it was darker than the inside of a cow.  We were climbing nicely in the frigid, dense air when suddenly the cabin was filled with loud, unfamiliar noise. It sounded like we were taking .50 caliber gunfire. My brain quickly dismissed that as an unlikely scenario as I scanned for possibilities. To the student’s credit, he continued to fly the airplane and simply asked, “What’s that?” I scanned the flight and engine instruments and all indications were normal and the airplane was apparently flying without difficulty. The racket continued however so I told the student to fly a normal pattern and return for a landing. As we entered the downwind leg I realized that the noise was coming from above us and the only items up there were an antenna and two fuel caps. We landed normally and soon confirmed that a fuel cap had come loose and was flapping against the fuselage directly above our head, safely tethered by its retaining chain.

Other than a few dings in the paint, the airplane was undamaged. Very little, if any fuel had siphoned out of the open fuel filler hole. No harm – no foul. I replaced the offending fuel cap and checked the security of the other cap and we departed again. The lesson was completed without further incident.

My bucket of experience got a bit more full having learned the valuable lesson that critical preflight inspection items must not be entrusted to anyone else. Two individuals who I believed to be competent, the line person and my student, had both handled the fuel cap. whether one or both was at fault in not properly securing the fuel cap is immaterial. It was my responsibility to make sure the airplane was prepared for flight.

It wasn’t until several years later that I realized the potential hazard presented by that loose fuel cap. At first, I did not consider the incident to have presented much danger. Even if fuel had been siphoning out of the tank, there was little fire risk since it would have streamed harmlessly past the tail. Even if the entire tank had been emptied, we still would have had a full tank remaining for our local flight, providing I selected the unaffected fuel tank to prevent cross-feed. So fuel exhaustion was not likely. The hazard presented was the increased risk of loss-of-control due to the distraction. Recall that it was a dark, moonless night. What I did not mention was that nobody onboard held an instrument rating. Back in the early 1970s, holding an instrument rating was not a requirement for a commercial pilot certificate or a flight instructor certificate. I had followed the normal progression for the time in obtaining my commercial pilot certificate and then my flight instructor certificate first, then using my instructing revenue for my instrument rating and my CFII. So there I was providing flight instruction to a primary student on a dark moonless night with no horizon and no instrument rating and now facing a formidable distraction. I suspect my luck bucket suffered some serious depletion that night.

So how can we mitigate the effects of such a diverse group of accident causal factors that have little in common? There is no single, simple answer to that but there are some things we can do to be more proactive. First and foremost, we must know the aircraft systems and maintain a high level of proficiency in the aircraft. The best way to do that is to be actively engaged in a formal recurrent training program.  We don’t necessarily have to enroll with one of the “big box” training providers. Any competent CFI who is familiar with our specific aircraft should be able to create a program. And let’s not forget that the FAA Wings program will create a custom program for us automatically.

Also, we often know what we need to do but we fall short in the execution. We need to strengthen our resolve to have and use a checklist for each phase of flight, including the preflight inspection. We must resolve to keep our aircraft maintained to a very high standard, including compliance with service bulletins. We must also resolve to establish and enforce sterile cockpit procedures during critical phases of flight, including taxi.

Of course there are many other little things that can and do begin or continue an error chain. A cabin door popping open, an ill-timed question or statement by a passenger, an indication of a landing gear problem, an alternator going offline, unfamiliarity with technology, and many more “little things” can cause a distraction. A simple item missed on a preflight inspection or on a checklist can cause big problems in flight. And then there is the mistaken belief that just a little frost on the airplane is OK.

So, in summary we need to pay attention to the “big ticket” accident causal factors that get most of the attention. But we also need to be on top of our game, apply discipline and follow established procedures to help prevent the little things from becoming huge monsters.

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles and also write us a comment if you see a problem (or want to contribute an article). We always need more input on aviation excellence or flight safety. There are many highly qualified SAFE members out there! If you are not yet a member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun.

National Election Day may still be a week away, but in Frederick, Maryland, the voters have spoken—and the winner is Brenda Tibbs, named Best Flight Instructor in the 2016 Flight Training Poll.

The good news doesn’t stop there for the 2,000-hour CFI who just two months ago stepped out on her own to found Bravo Flight Training after six years as an instructor for an established FBO. On the day she learned about her electoral success, Tibbs also received final municipal approval to run her flight school at the airport, ratifying a process in the works since summer.

Like her counterpart in Orlando, Tibbs will soon add an aircraft to her fleet that now consists of a Cessna 150 and a Cessna 172. The new arrival, a Piper Arrow, will give her students access to an aircraft with retractable landing gear and a constant-speed prop for advanced training.

Tibbs said instructing for her last employer, and during previous tenure working at AOPA—where she served members in the Pilot Information Center and later as a flying club specialist—has been an “awesome” experience.

But she felt something was missing from pilot training—something she could zero in on in her new venture: a sense of community.

“Everyone was coming, taking lessons and leaving, and not connecting,” she said.

Tibbs knew from working on member service programs at AOPA that retaining pilots as active members of the general aviation community is a high priority, because a sense of community is one reason people love to fly.

So in addition to her flight schedule and working out details of getting the new flight school up and running, Tibbs organizes regular activities that benefit her airport’s community such as monthly gatherings that spotlight educational topics in a social atmosphere.

A recent get-together featured two designated pilot examiners who discussed their roles and gave attendees a chance to ask questions. An upcoming session will bring pilots and air traffic controllers together.

Carving out a niche is a way to give any business an edge, and Tibbs has found an important role as an instructor of the pilots of the future. It’s a great fit for the mother of a teen and a fitting follow-on to her work with Frederick Aviation Explorers, a local youth development program.

It also has this advantage: “That’s what I love to do,” she said.

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles and also write us a comment if you see a problem (or want to contribute an article). We always need more input on aviation excellence or flight safety. There are many highly qualified SAFE members out there! If you are not yet a member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun.

As pilots and caring humans we should all aspire to be more like Bob Hoover. What an incredible person and pilot he was and what an example of a life well lived. (Safe journeys West Bob.) From the young WWII P-51 fighter ace/patriot to early jet test pilot and then amazing airshow genius, he did it all and in an elegant and gracious manner.

“Bob Hoover was so much more than a great pilot. He was a great man and a model for what our community can and should be.”  AOPA’s Mark Baker

WWII Ace/POW/Test Pilot

Check Yaeger’s wingman X-1 Project

Phenomenal air show performer

Amazing, generous mentor

To live constantly on the edge of disaster for so many years and die peacefully at 94 bears clear testimony to Bob’s piloting skills and also his risk management acumen. He performed every show with a joy, passion and precision that was unmatched in the industry. He was quoted as saying “Someday I might die in one of these shows. But you know what? It’ll take the mortician a week to get the smile off my face!” Because he pursued excellence in everything he did (but especially flying) Bob survived some incredibly challenging situations; his skill, courage and ingenuity brought him through every crisis.

And though aviation can unfortunately be a business of big egos and “me first” personalities, Bob Hoover was always a gracious and sharing mentor throughout his career. His kindred spirit Sean D. Tucker clearly credits Bob Hoover with saving his life as a result of his early fatherly advice! As a younger air show pilot, aggressively pushing the edge, Sean relates how Bob Hoover approached him at an airshow and clearly explained how Sean’s days were limited if he did not build a little more margin into his flying routine. Though not apparent to us mere mortals, Tucker admits this sage (and initially unwelcome) advice saved his life more than once when mechanical issues cropped up unexpectedly. “I would not have made it without him.”

Aerobatic performer Patty Wagstaff also cites Bob Hoover as an important mentor and coach throughout her career: “If I wasn’t sure how to handle a situation, I would always think, ‘How would Bob handle that?’ ” Fortunately, aviation at our level involves a lot less risk. But Bob’s example can work for everyone in our flying and our interaction with other pilots.

I would encourage all pilots to aspire to be “more like Bob” both in pursuing excellence and professionalism in every flight AND in promoting safety and keeping watch over our fellow aviators. Please take a page from Bob’s playbook and both build a safety margin into your flying (pursue excellence) and also put a friendly hand on the shoulder of any pilot you see on the road to disaster; “friends don’t let friends fly unsafe!” (How many times have we mumbled the words “accident waiting to happen” but done nothing?) Your better piloting self and mentorship will truly be the best tribute to our amazing friend Bob Hoover!

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles and also write us a comment if you see a problem (or want to contribute an article). We always need more input on aviation excellence or flight safety. There are many highly qualified SAFE members out there! If you are not yet a member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun.

To: The Airman Certification Standards Working Group

 Introduction

The following remarks pertain to requirements in the Private Pilot-Airplane Airman Certification Standards (ACS) regarding maneuvering during slow flight, specifically: PA.VII.A.S2 and PA.VII.A.S3.(1)

For some context, I have been a full time flight instructor since 1987. I am a nine-time Master Instructor, the 2014 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year, and the 2006 National Flight Instructor of the Year. I am a recognized subject matter expert on loss of control in general aviation with the following experience:

* 10,000 hours of total flight time

* 9,000 hours of flight instruction given

* 25,000 landings

* 34,000 spins in 235 general aviation aircraft

* 500 single-engine aircraft N-numbers in my logbook

* 380 aviation talks presented

* More than 75 aviation articles and three aviation textbooks published

At issue is wording in the ACS that requires applicants to demonstrate the following levels of skill while maneuvering during slow flight:

“Establish and maintain an airspeed, approximately 5-10 knots above the 1G stall speed, at which the airplane is capable of maintaining controlled flight without activating a stall warning.”

“Accomplish coordinated straight-and-level flight, turns, climbs, and descents with landing gear and flap configurations specified by the evaluator without activating a stall warning.”(2)

ACS Wording Versus Airworthiness Standards

Given FAA airworthiness standards concerning stall warning systems, the simultaneous requirements of “5–10 knots above the 1G stall speed” and “without activating a stall warning” are incompatible. Airworthiness standards in effect in 1993, for example, required the following:

“stall warning must begin at a speed exceeding the stalling speed by a margin of not less than 5 knots, but not more than the greater of 10 knots or 15 percent of the stalling speed…”(3)

Airworthiness standards since 1996, on the other hand, have required stall warning activation to begin “at a speed exceeding the stalling speed by a margin of not less than 5 knots…”(4) This standard does not specify an upper speed limit for activation of stall warning systems. As a result, while stall warning could be activated—indeed, should be activated per airworthiness standards—no less than 5 knots before the reference stall speed, it could activate with a significantly greater margin to the stall speed.

The ACS requirement to fly without activating stall warning clearly conflicts with the simultaneous requirement to establish and maintain an airspeed 5–10 knots above the reference stall speed. Moreover, design parameters that determine when artificial stall warning activates are beyond the control of the applicant—so much so that an applicant may be forced to transition out of slow flight to prevent stall warning from activating, defeating the purpose of this task altogether.

FAA Justification

The incompatibility between the ACS wording and airworthiness standards notwithstanding, the FAA has offered the following justifications:

“The guidance has always intended for there not [emphasis added] to be a stall warning—and that is consistent with slow flight guidance published in AC 120-111.”(5)

“Advocating maneuvering the airplane just below the critical angle of attack with the stall warning activated is neither desirable nor intended.”(6)

These assertions are demonstrably false. For at least several decades now, FAA guidance has been unambiguous about its intent to have stall warning activated while maneuvering during slow flight. For example, in the FAA’s General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study conducted in 1975–76 (the FAA Study):

“the student slowed the aircraft to the speed at which the visual or aural stall warning indicator was continually activated [emphasis added]…. Turns were also made at 30° angle of bank with the stall warning indicator continually activated [emphasis added].”(7)

The objective during the FAA Study was for student-participants “to maintain desired heading and altitude at an airspeed and angle of attack which activated the stall warning device [emphasis added], but which did not cause the aircraft to stall.”(8) Two noteworthy results from this study:

“The most effective additional training was slow flight with realistic distractions, which exposed the subjects to situations where they are likely to experience inadvertent stalls.”(9)

“The extra stall and slow flight training was effective in preventing unintentional spins [emphasis added]”(10)

Training in slow flight with stall warning activated coupled with realistic distractions was effective in preventing unintentional spins. Read that again: Slow flight with stall warning activated coupled with realistic distractions was effective in preventing unintentional spins.

The results of this landmark study have driven FAA stall/spin training policy ever since, starting with the introduction of realistic distractions in 1980, followed by the shift from “stall avoidance training” to “stall and spin awareness training” in 1991.(11,12)

Derived from the FAA study, the series of Advisory Circulars (ACs) entitled, Stall and Spin Awareness Training has offered “guidance to flight instructors who provide that training.”(13) The following wording appears in AC 61-67B published in May 1991 through AC 61-67C (Change 2) published in January 2016. All of these ACs recommend the following in Chapter 2, “Stall Avoidance Practice at Slow Airspeeds”:

“(1) Assign a heading and an altitude. Have the student reduce power and slow to an airspeed just above the stall speed…”

“(2) Have the student maintain heading and altitude with the stall warning device activated [emphasis added].”(14,15)

FAA guidance for at least a quarter century has been crystal clear, and for good reason: Training in slow flight with stall warning activated, coupled with realistic distractions, is effective in preventing unintentional spins. “Maneuvering an airplane just below the critical angle of attack with the stall warning activated” not only has been intended, but also is desirable if preventing unintentional spins remains a safety priority with FAA.

Regarding the reference to AC 120-111, slow flight is described therein as “flight just above the stall speed.”(16) This specialized flight training element is intended to expose pilots to “how to maneuver the airplane…without stalling.”(17) The status of the stall warning system during slow flight is not mentioned in this AC. However, the AC does list “manually controlled slow flight” under the heading “Extended Envelope Training.”(18) Revising the long-understood meaning of slow flight as a condition “with the stall warning system activated” now to one “without activation” is incongruous with, and a move away from, the whole concept of “Extended Envelope Training” mandated by CFR §121.423.

In reality, the treatment of slow flight in AC 120-111 is consistent with recommendations made by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO describes this specialized training element as follows:

“Slow flight exposes the trainee to flight right above the stall speed of the aeroplane and to manoeuvring [sic] the aeroplane at this speed without stalling. The purpose is to reinforce the basic stall characteristics learned in academics and allow the pilot to obtain handling experience and motion sensations when operating the aeroplane at slow speeds during the entire approach-to-stall regime in various aeroplane attitudes, configurations and bank angles.”(19)

The “approach-to-stall regime” referenced by ICAO is defined as “Flight conditions bordered by stall warning and aerodynamic stall.”(20) Activation of the stall warning system during slow flight is an obvious and integral part of ICAO’s Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (UPRT) framework—the very same framework that informed AC 120-111.(21)

The assertion that no activation of stall warning is somehow “consistent with guidance on slow flight published in AC 120-111” is unsubstantiated at best, disingenuous at worst.

Further Rationalization

The August 2016 issue of DPE Tips offers further justification for the ACS wording: “The FAA does not advocate disregarding a stall warning while maneuvering an airplane.”(22)

It does not follow that having a student learn to maneuver in slow flight with stall warning activated advocates “intentional disregard” for stall warning. I am not aware of any studies that show a correlation between exposure to stall warning and increased inoculation to it. Recall the FAA Study found that training in slow flight with stall warning activated coupled with realistic distractions was effective in preventing unintentional spins.

Consistent with longstanding FAA guidance on stall and spin awareness training, pilots should be taught to integrate sight, sound, and feel while maneuvering in slow flight. They should also be taught to acknowledge stall warning and understand its ramifications. The ability to fly the airplane precisely while stall warning is activated can be a confidence building exercise as well as a way to incorporate angle of attack (AOA) and G-load awareness in real time. While many permutations are possible, following is an example of dialogue that might occur between an instructor (CFI) and student (STU) while practicing slow flight with stall warning activated:

CFI:      Do you hear the stall warning?

STU:      Yes.

CFI:      From now on, I want you at least to verbally acknowledge it every time you hear it.

CFI:      We are hearing stall warning in this particular configuration, but when else might we hear it?

STU:      At any speed, in any attitude, at any power setting.

CFI:      Is mechanical stall warning 100 percent reliable?

STU:      No.

CFI:      What other indications of reduced margin to the stall might we expect?

STU:      Reduced control effectiveness and more pronounced engine effects.

CFI:      What conditions could cause you to miss hearing the stall warning?

STU:      High workload in the traffic pattern, distractions, stress, lack of proficiency.

CFI:      I dropped my pencil, please pick it up for me.

STU:      Not now, I’m busy aviating!

CFI:      What does stall warning mean?

STU:      We are operating at high angle of attack, close to the critical angle.

CFI:      With regard to your control inputs, what else does stall warning mean?

STU:      Do not pull the elevator control any farther aft.

CFI:      Are we in a stall?

STU:      No, it’s just stall warning.

CFI:      What will happen if you apply additional back elevator pressure now?

STU:      We’ll stall the airplane.

CFI:      What could happen if we encountered a vertical gust right now?

STU:      We could stall the airplane.

CFI:      What will happen if we increase the G-load by trying to execute a steep turn now?

STU:      We’ll probably stall the airplane.

CFI:      What should you do if we encounter the stall?

STU:      Push the elevator forward.

CFI:      What should you do if the engine were to quit now?

STU:      Push the elevator forward.

CFI:      What should you do to increase our margin of safety to the stall?

STU:      Push the elevator forward.

CFI:      What should you do to silence stall warning?

STU:      Push the elevator forward.

CFI:      What should you do to lower the angle of attack?

STU:      Push the elevator forward.

CFI:      Outside of this training exercise, what will you do if you inadvertently trigger stall warning?

STU:      Push the elevator forward.

CFI:      If you’re not sure what to do when stall warning activates, what should you do?

STU:      Push the elevator forward.

CFI:      Do you see a trend in the answers to the above questions?

STU:       Yes, push on the elevator, don’t pull.

Despite the ACS wording and attempts to justify it, the FAA “still expects a pilot to know and understand the aerodynamics behind how the airplane performs from the time the stall warning is activated to reaching a full stall.”(23) Based on this, it seems not only logical to continue to train and test this critical task as it was done in the FAA Study and as recommended in FAA guidance on stall and spin awareness training. It is also imperative for safety since doing this has been shown to be effective in preventing unintentional spins.

Recommendations

As worded, ACS PA.VII.A.S2 and PA.VII.A.S3:

* Retreat from an established training paradigm shown to be “effective in preventing unintentional spins” and, in combination with realistic distractions, the “most effective” training for situations where pilots “are likely to experience inadvertent stalls.”(24,25)

* Diminish the importance of gaining valuable experience and confidence with degradation in flight control responsiveness and more pronounced engine effects, as well as the importance of proper coordination in slow flight near the critical angle of attack.

* Contradict longstanding FAA policy and guidance on stall and spin awareness training, as well as recent ICAO recommendations on upset prevention and recovery training.

* Will impede efforts to reduce fatal loss of control accidents in general aviation.

Rather than moving away from a training and testing strategy proven effective in preventing unintentional spins, as well as from the current trend toward incorporating UPRT into all levels of pilot training, I strongly urge FAA to:

1. Realign wording in the ACS and Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3) with longstanding FAA guidance and more recent ICAO recommendations on training and testing within the approach-to-stall regime.
2. Abandon plans to revise other FAA publications to reflect current ACS wording, and rescind Safety Alert for Operators 16010.
3. Redouble its efforts to emphasize and encourage stall/spin awareness training according to longstanding guidance.
4. Ensure that ground and flight instructors are indeed well-versed in stall/spin dynamics in theory and in practice, as well as in the available training guidance.
5. Promote AOA and G-load awareness per recommendations from the SAFE Symposium Curricula Breakout Group.(26)

The current ACS wording on slow flight is a step backwards, discourages incorporation of UPRT concepts and extended envelope training, and has the potential to reduce safety.

Respectfully,

Rich Stowell, MCFI-A

Endnotes

(1) FAA, Private Pilot–Airplane, Airman Certification Standards (FAA-S-ACS-6, Change 1), June 2016, 54.

(2) FAA, Private Pilot–Airplane, Airman Certification Standards, 54.

(3) FAA, Part 23–Airworthiness Standards (specifically §23.207), January 1, 1993, 164.

(4) FAA, Part 23–Airworthiness Standards (specifically §23.207), accessed August 19, 2016, available http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/faa_regulations/

(5) Email from 9-AVS-ACS-Focus-Team@faa.gov to Howard Wolvington, 10 June 2016.

(6) FAA, Safety Alert for Pilots (SAFO 16010), August 30, 2016, 3.

(7) William C. Hoffman and Walter M. Hollister, General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study (FAA-RD-77-26), September 1976, 24.

(8) Hoffman and Hollister, General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study, 29.

(9) Hoffman and Hollister, General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study, 57.

(10) Hoffman and Hollister, General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study, 56.

(11) See Use of Distractions During Pilot Certification Flight Tests (AC 61-91), January 25, 1980.

(12) See Stall and Spin Awareness Training (AC 61-67B), May 17, 1991.

(13) FAA, Stall and Spin Awareness Training (AC 61-67B), May 17, 1991, 1.

(14) FAA, Stall and Spin Awareness Training, 10.

(15) FAA, Stall and Spin Awareness Training (AC 61-67C, Change 2), January 6, 2016, 9.

(16) FAA, Upset Prevention and Recovery Training (AC 120-111), April 14, 2015, Appendix 1, 9.

(17) FAA, Upset Prevention and Recovery Training, Appendix 1, 9.

(18) FAA, Upset Prevention and Recovery Training, Appendix 1, 2.

(19) ICAO, Manual on Aeroplane Upset Prevention and Recovery Training, 2014, 3-9.

(20) ICAO, Manual on Aeroplane Upset Prevention and Recovery Training, x.

(21) FAA, Upset Prevention and Recovery Training, 1.

(22) DPE Tips (Vol 1, Issue 3), August 2016, 1.

(23) DPE Tips, 2.

(24) Hoffman and Hollister, General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study, 56.

(25) Hoffman and Hollister, General Aviation Pilot Stall Awareness Training Study, 57.

(26) Society of Aviation and Flight Educators, Pilot Training Reform Symposium: Preliminary Report (June 6, 2011), 29.

You can find the official SAFE position and recommendations here.

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Two scenarios from the airline world, and why they matter in single-pilot airplanes…

Scenario 1

The First Officer of a Regional Jet operating under a code-share agreement to a major airline, who is also a FLYING LESSONS reader, related a recent experience. About 10 minutes after departing from a major hub airport a flight attendant (FA) telephoned the cockpit informing the crew that a passenger was having a medical emergency. No one had responded to the FA’s query of the passengers to see if any had medical experience. The FA indeed had past medical experience and was caring for the passenger as much as conditions permitted. The FA recommended the crew land to deliver the passenger to skills medical assistance.

The Captain agreed, and handed control of the aircraft to the First Officer (FO). The Captain (CA) then began coordinating with company dispatchers over the radio while maintaining contact with the FA to track the passenger’s condition. The FO assumed “single pilot” control of the jetliner, running checklists, setting up for a visual approach and “working the radios” with Air Traffic Control (ATC), and flying the airplane—alone—while the CA continued to monitor the medical emergency and relay information to company dispatchers.

With only about five months’ experience flying jet airplanes and with zero experience in single- pilot operations in a crew-required jet other than a couple of simulator “incapacitated captain” training drills during new-hire indoctrination, the FO programmed the avionics, configured the aircraft, prepped and briefed for the visual approach. Reported winds were almost directly across the runway, and while doing everything else alone the FO computed the wind to be “right at” the jet’s maximum crosswind component as limited by company procedures.

The FO flew the approach without monitoring or callouts from the CA, and made a “challenging” crosswind landing. By the CA’s own choice the CA was out of the loop until the airplane was on the ground and they were taxiing to a gate. An ambulance crew met the airplane at the gate and took charge of caring for and transporting the passenger.

According to the FO, the company’s manual calls for the CA to take charge of any inflight emergency. The CA apparently interpreted this to mean handing all flight responsibility to the FO and assuming personal control of company response communications while also remaining in contact with the FA who was caring for the passenger. The FO told me that this was indeed what is called for in the regional airline’s operating procedures.

Scenario 2

This one I probably don’t have to explain. I’m talking about the “Miracle on the Hudson,” as described in the recent theatrical release Sully. I was able to see the film recently, and am working on the assumption it accurately portrays at least the inflight portion of the story it tells (I suspect some other aspects of the story were embellished to heighten tension, notably the conduct of the NTSB investigation and hearing, which likely was treated with some license—a movie needs an antagonist, and there’s no tension from blaming the birds).

See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sully_(film)

Here’s a synopsis of the story, from the website linked above: On January 15, 2009, US Airways pilots Captain Chesley “Sully”

Sullenberger and First Officer Jeffrey Skiles board US Airways Flight 1549 from LaGuardia Airport to Charlotte Douglas International Airport. Barely three minutes into the flight, at an approximate altitude of 2,800 feet (approx. 850 m), the Airbus A320 hits a flock of Canada geese, disabling both engines. Without engine power or airports within a safe distance…Sully decides to ditch the aircraft on the Hudson River. Sully manages to land the aircraft in the Hudson without any casualties.

It’s a very good movie, and it also highlights an issue I mention frequently in FLYING LESSONS: the delay between the onset of an abnormal or emergency condition that causes even a highly proficient pilot (or crew) to delay actions necessary to get the aircraft safely on the ground (or water), because of the “startle factor” and denial of an unexpected event followed the typical pilot’s actions to attempt to remedy the situation before finally deciding decisive action is needed.

As part of that reaction the crew accomplished memory steps of the published emergency procedures, additionally taking an educated leap to accomplish some of the procedures out of order to improve the chances of success…the movie does not explain why, but Sullenberger turned on the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) sooner than the sequence of checklist steps called out, presumably to provide some additional thrust as well as assure continuation of electrical power (the APU is a fairly strong jet engine of its own, mounted in the tail, that would add some to the A320’s glide ratio).

Throughout the emergency the two acted as a crew. Sully took the flight controls (Skiles was Pilot Flying on that leg) and commanded his FO to run the Dual Engine Flameout checklist. After quickly determining that a “controlled water touchdown” on the river was their best option they probably referenced the Ditching checklist, but that was not portrayed in the movie. They advised the passengers and started the well-trained reaction of the cabin crew. A good leader, once all was done and they were committed to the water landing, Captain Sullenberger asked his First Officer if he had any ideas—knowing that no one pilot can always have all the ideas alone.

LESSSONS for the single-pilot

I emphasize that in both cases—the Regional Jet and US Airways 1549, the flight ended without fatalities. In both cases the crew appeared to do everything the “book” told them to do. In the case of the Regional Jet all but one passenger and crew were delayed, but were able to fly out on the same aircraft later the same day. In both cases what’s really important, leaving no one at the scene of a crash, was the result.

But what do you think is the big difference between the way these two events were handled by the flight crews?

Think about that for a moment……

I’ll wait.

OK, here’s my take: In the case of US Airway 1549, the cockpit crew worked as a team. Although the situation, as it turns out, was unprecedented, they processed checklists the way they had been trained just in case there was something that could have fixed the problem or at least improved their chances. In the heat of the moment it would have been easy to forget to do something that calmer minds had documented in the checklists years before, when the stress was not affecting their thinking and they had time and other resources to come up with the best possible procedure. Sully and Skiles did what they had been trained to do. Most importantly, in my view, they flew the airplane as close to normal as they could, removing as many variables as possible. When they had completed everything training and experience prepared them to do, they went beyond their training and did what they had to do for the passengers and crew to survive.

In the case of the Regional Jet, at the onset of a medical emergency the crew abandoned almost everything it had been trained to do. The FO was left to fly single-pilot in an airplane and using techniques he had never done before, flying a high-workload return to a busy hub airport to land at the edge of the airplane’s approved crosswind envelope without the help and quality control check of a second pilot. Frankly, other than assure an ambulance crew was waiting for the passenger when they arrived at the gate the CA added absolutely nothing to the passenger’s care or chances of surviving the medical condition—that was up to the flight attendant. However, the CA could have done a whole lot more to assure a safe and expeditious arrival at the gate for all the passengers, including the one needing attention, by remaining engaged as part of the cockpit crew and retaining command of the high-workload return and challenging crosswind landing.

Yes, the FO handled this all well. But if he had not, the NTSB investigators might have been as unforgiving of the captain and the crew as they were portrayed in the movie describing the other event.

Here’s the LESSON for the vast majority of FLYING LESSONS reader, who do not fly as part of a cockpit crew, or if they do, may at times fly single-pilot as well. In an abnormal or emergency situation, do everything you can to make the remainder of the flight as normal as possible.

Use your training. Follow your checklists. Don’t try to land faster than normal, or slower than normal, or on a shorter or busier runway than normal, unless you absolutely have no choice.

Fly like Sullenberger and Skiles, following procedures that just might work until you confirm they do not. Only then, use your experience to go beyond your training.

Don’t abandon everything you’ve practiced and try to make up new techniques and procedures, especially while you’re under extreme stress and don’t have time to detect all of the status that may affect the outcome of your flight. Practice your normal, abnormal and emergency procedures until you know them well, then review and practice them regularly. You can’t expect to be successful operating outside the normal envelope in an extreme situation if you aren’t very familiar with where the edges of that envelope lay.

You might try to abandon your training. It might turn out OK. But your actions will be hard to defend—and if anyone get hurt, your guilt hard to assuage—if something does go wrong.

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles and also write us a comment if you see a problem (or want to contribute an article). We always need more input on aviation excellence or flight safety. There are many highly qualified SAFE members out there! If you are not yet a member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun.

Several years ago I was invited by the FAA to give a presentation at a required training event for designated pilot examiners (DPEs). My talk was titled, “Do No Harm!” That title was taken from the oath administered to new physicians in which they are admonished to always leave their patients in better condition after their treatment than before. My presentation featured several reconstructions of accidents where the actions of CFIs and DPEs had been a contributing cause. Yes, there have been accidents, even fatal ones, on checkrides.

My presentation was just a little more than one hour, a small part of an all day event. As the day unfolded, the term “gatekeeper” was used numerous times by the several presenters. The group was told that the CFI must be the “gatekeeper” to make sure that all pilots are competent in their skill, knowledge, and decision-making.

By mid afternoon, my stomach was getting an uneasy feeling. I reviewed what I had eaten for lunch and decided that since I had passed up the chilidog for the turkey sandwich on wheat bread, food wasn’t at fault. That gnawing in my gut must be from what I was hearing. If the CFI is the gatekeeper, why had my research found so many instructional accidents in the past five years? Who is keeping the gate on the gatekeepers? The FAA? Hardly. They don’t have the staff necessary to perform even the most basic level of oversight.

Then I had my epiphany. Most accidents, whether or not involving instruction, are not caused by a lack of skill or knowledge. They are also not caused by a lack of decision-making skills. Pilots making poor decisions cause accidents. How’s that again? There is a difference between having the ability to make good decisions regarding any aspect of a flight and actually making a good decision. A flight instructor can test the ability of a student to make good decisions but cannot effectively determine whether the student will actually make good decisions once certified.

Here is an example. An instructor may begin a cross-country flight into an area of deteriorating weather to determine if the student can evaluate the weather and make an appropriate decision on whether to continue, divert to an alternate airport, or return to the departure airport. From my experience as a flight instructor I can state that 99% of the time the student will make an appropriate decision. But that is an artificial environment in which the student advances only by making the safest possible decision. The real environment encountered once the pilot is certified has many outside determiners. The pilot’s decision may be influenced by the need to get to the destination on time, the costs associated with diverting to an alternate location, ego, machismo, or others factors.

So my point is simply this. Neither the flight instructor nor the designated examiner can really be the gatekeeper. We must all be our own gatekeepers. We have the tools to make the right decisions. We must make those appropriate decisions every time we fly.

I will relate a brief personal story. In the late 1970s I was a faculty member at an aviation college in Florida and I supplemented my income by flying part-time for a charter company. I was required to take a Part 135 checkride with an FAA inspector. As luck would have it, I drew the inspector with the hard-posterior reputation. I was nervous about the ride and I tried really hard to do everything by the book. The inspector really put me through the wringer and I was drenched when the ride was done, even though it was a cool day by Florida standards. During the debrief, the inspector not only told me that I had passed, but told me that it was one of the best rides he had given. Before my head could swell too much he said that he wanted to give me some advice. He told me that he was well aware of his reputation as being tough to please. He said that he was also aware that I probably wasn’t as diligent when not on a checkride. Then came the advice. He said, “If you want to have a successful career in aviation and live to get old, make believe that I am in your jumpseat on every flight and make all your decisions accordingly.” Those words stuck with me through more than 15,000 accident-free flight hours.

So in summary, I learned early in my career to be my own gatekeeper and I would encourage all pilots to do the same.

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles and also write us a comment if you see a problem (or want to contribute an article). We always need more input on aviation excellence or flight safety. There are many highly qualified SAFE members out there! If you are not yet a member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun.

Visit Gene Benson Safety Initiative 

The Practical Test Standards was a great tool for its time but clearly represented the dominant view of psychology back in the 1970s; behaviorism. The sum total of human evaluation was what you could see from the outside. As we prepared for our CFI tests many years ago we all recited “learning is a change in behavior as a result of experience” to prepare for our CFI evaluations and humorously referred to the government CFI training manual as “good dog, bad dog.” If a testing standard is a presentation of what a good pilot should look like, the PTS was clearly a one-dimensional, black and white sketch of a three-dimensional, color world. Of course we all knew there was more and the manuals were evolving to reflect more modern practices. For me personally, Greg Brown’s original Savvy Flight Instructor book changed my whole world view of the instructor’s role and brought motivation and inner psychology into a more central role. The government manuals at the time still presented  what you could see from the outside, how to “wiggled the stick”not think your way out of a problem. Good instructors, of course, always covered extensive cognitive topics…but these were not tested. As a consequence many unlucky pilots were trained without this “added value” and never developed higher order thinking skills like risk management.

And as a pilot examiner “back in the day” I remember writing out more than one temporary certificate (yes with a pen on carbon paper) for an applicant who had “performed” very well, but gave me a sense of unease. Though this new pilot clearly met the practical test standard, there were also most definitely missing elements that a safe pilot should know and consider; primarily judgement and thinking skills. And though as examiners we may counsel, advise (and pray) in the debrief, we are held to the legal government testing document. We give the “government’s test” and not some personal version. The PTS toolkit of the time did not include a lot of cognitive, risk management elements. As time passed, emphasis items in the PTS preface multiplied to reflect cognitive “best practices” but the PTS tool was outdated, limited and increasingly disjointed. The FAA manuals had evolved considerably over time but the testing standard had not.

The new Airman Certification Standard presents a more comprehensive vision of what a safe pilot should be. It includes the historic PTS skill elements but integrates the thinking skills of what a pilot should know and consider as well. There have been criticisms of its length (of course) but this document is designed to be more comprehensive. We now have a full color picture of a pilot rather than the PTS pencil sketch. And now that examiners have this tool to evaluate the whole pilot (skill, knowledge and judgement) the applicants as a group seem (to me) to be improving and better prepared to be safer, comprehensive pilots. In the past three months my pilot applicants, prepared to the new ACS, seem more thoughtful and well versed in the thinking/planning skills…because we can test this. Of course there will be some wrinkles to iron out in this new standard but it is a superior testing/training tool. My appreciation goes out to those who worked so hard to create this document (and endured the slings and arrows…) This is an ambitious move on the part of the FAA and a hopeful new step toward safer flying.

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles and also write us a comment if you see a problem (or want to contribute an article). We always need more input on aviation excellence or flight safety. There are many highly qualified SAFE members out there! If you are not yet a member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun.

The Sully story is reborn on the big screen and all pilots get to bask in the glory of this amazing aviation “save”. Please take pride in Sully’s success and  use this opportunity to promote “SAFE aviation” in all your social circles. But I wonder how any of us mortals would do with two engines out in an “Airbus Glider?” Sully dead sticks his plane successfully into the Hudson and all 155 lives are saved. You could not dream up a better professional piloting story!

Unfortunately, less than a month later we suffered a tragic piloting failure with Colgin 3407. This new academy-trained Captain decelerated into a mushing, slow flight condition on final approach into Buffalo, NY. Tired and distracted, he not only ignored all stall indicators, but actually defeated the shaker/pusher stall protection system. All 49 on board and one person on the ground died horrible deaths as a result of his errors. This is not my analysis, it comes from the NTSB report. As pilots we are held to an incredibly high standard.

I can’t help but think this is a “teachable moment” for all pilots and motivation to try harder everyday. I present this story of contrasting pilot skills at Oshkosh and Sun ‘N Fun in just this manner with the question, “Who would you rather be?” Obviously we should all strive for excellence and professionalism and channel “the Sully” in our flying.

The unfortunate Colgan 3407 captain had taken the “flight academy short course” and had failed 5 evaluations on the way to his Colgan Captain slot. He was obviously not prepared to cope with the disaster he helped create. But viewed in a wider lens, someone in our flight training industry  had made promises and failed this unfortunate pilot. He never got the complete training and true skills he needed to be a safe pilot. These flight training loopholes should not exist if we value safety.

At SAFE we promote excellence in aviation education and no story could make the need for our resources and safety advocacy more obvious. Creating and sustaining superb aviation educators exponentially creates a safer aviation industry, one pilot at a time. This horrible accident resulted in new ATP requirements and stall training was modified in our advanced pilot testing standards. But this discussion continues, the need is still there, and the standards are still evolving. SAFE is again leading the change.

SAFE just sent our 6 page proposal for improving the controversial ACS slow flight maneuver to the FAA. This will go to committee on September 14th. We have numerous people on the AWS panel all passionately committed to creating a better testing document. We are all volunteer and encourage you to help. Join SAFE and support our safety advocacy and commitment to excellence in aviation education.

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles and also write us a comment if you see a problem or want to contribute an article. We always need more input on aviation excellence or flight safety. There are many highly qualified SAFE members out there! If you are not yet a member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun.

We live in an age where we are told on a daily basis that more laws, stricter regulations, and the latest technology will keep us safe from harm.  In regard to general aviation, we have more regulations and enhanced technology than ever before, but we still have a certain number of accidents every year attributed to human error.  The FAA and NTSB are asking why.  Pilots and flight instructors are asking why.  The list of possible reasons why grows longer each year, and yet, accidents still occur.
It seems that nobody wants to actually consider the possibility that “a zero accident rate” is impossible to achieve.  But that might be the case simply because of how the human mind works.  Each of us perceives safety (and conversely, danger) in our own particular way.  Some pilots have no perception of danger because they lack the knowledge and experience necessary to understand the inherent risks associated with flying.  Other pilots are aware of certain flight hazards, but believe those hazards are no threat because their airplane has the latest and greatest instruments and avionics.  Many pilots do understand the hazards of flight, but have somehow convinced themselves nothing calamitous will ever happen to them.
In 2016, pilots have a wide range of useful instrumentation and technology available to them in the cockpit, but we still have accidents.  Again, we must ask why.  I still believe it goes back to human factors, which include inadequate risk assessment skills and false feelings of competency and/or proficiency.

Basic stall avoidance and stall recovery procedures must be demonstrated, not just talked about, to improve flight safety.  Too many pilots are overly reliant on instruments and technology to keep them safe rather than a basic understanding of aerodynamics.  An angle of attack indicator may be nice to have, but it should not be the only way a pilot can detect an impending stall.  All the technology in the world can’t save a pilot from stalling the airplane if he/she doesn’t (a) recognize the wing(s) is no longer producing lift (hence, stalled) and (b) know the most basic fix, which is to reduce the wing’s angle of attack.

     As a seasoned aviation educator and licensed mental health professional, I believe our efforts to enhance flight safety need to focus on teaching risk assessment skills and “best practices” in maintaining aircraft control.  The laws of physics do not change with the installation of an angle of attack indicator or the latest Garmin.  It still takes x-number of air molecules moving over the wings (or blades) to produce lift.  Airplanes can still stall at any airspeed and any attitude.  These are proven facts, not conjecture.
I’m a strong advocate for teaching pilots about aircraft control pressures and what they mean.  How does the airplane control yoke “feel” in your hand?  Is it heavy, stable, mushy?   What is causing the controls to feel that way?  While using a trim tab to adjust control pressure is necessary for larger aircraft, a pilot still should know the conditions under which the airplane controls feel heavy or mushy and what that may mean for safety of flight.
I also believe basic stall avoidance and stall recovery procedures must be demonstrated, not just talked about, to improve flight safety.  Too many pilots are overly reliant on instruments and technology to keep them safe rather than a basic understanding of aerodynamics.  An angle of attack indicator may be nice to have, but it should not be the only way a pilot can detect an impending stall.  All the technology in the world can’t save a pilot from stalling the airplane if he/she doesn’t (a) recognize the wing(s) is no longer producing lift (hence, stalled) and (b) know the most basic fix, which is to reduce the wing’s angle of attack.  Even with all the technology available in the Airbus 330, Air France Flight 447 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean on June 1, 2009, killing 228 people because the pilot did not recognize the airplane was in a stall.

     While we can certainly teach safety concepts and risk assessment procedures in a classroom setting, the only way a pilot will learn how to truly recognize potential loss of control situations (requiring the implementation of those concepts and procedures) is by flying the aircraft.  This is one reason why the current debate about the FAA changing the definition of “slow flight” is so important.  The FAA’s new definition of slow flight does not allow a pilot to actually experience how the airplane reacts when flying in a potentially dangerous region of the airspeed envelope.
I believe a prudent flight instructor should not allow a student to solo who hasn’t experienced what the stall warning horn sounds like, how the airplane controls “feel” when the wings are stalled, and what the proper stall recovery procedures are. In my opinion, there is no substitution for the student actually practicing stall recovery and experiencing other simulated flight emergencies.  Reading about it or watching a video are not the same thing as actual experience.  I urge each of you to think about how you as an instructor can help ensure the safe flight of your students once you exit the cockpit.

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles and please write us a comment if you see a problem or want to contribute an article. We always need more input on aviation excellence or flight safety. There are many highly qualified SAFE members out there! If you are not yet a member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile fun