Giving Pilots “Sharp Tools”?

S.A.F.E. is presenting “The Improbable Turn” this Thursday at 8PM with Rod Machado and Russ Still. Please sign-up here; we even have a Lightspeed Zulu 3 headset to give away to FAA registered pilots (WINGS)! At the heart of the issue is the poor unfortunate pilot in a suddenly quiet plane in the air on takeoff (and his CFI responsible for providing guidance and solutions). So if this turns out to be you, what’s the “best” answer; and if you are a CFI, do we convey the simplest, safest advice or potentially risk more danger with the “sharper tool” of a turn back maneuver requiring greater judgement and skill?

This title comes from my childhood experience growing up in a family of feral brothers and friends always playing in the extensive woods around our home. My father was criticized by a neighborhood “helicopter mom” for letting his young son have a pocket knife (this was hunting and fishing, not “in the hood”). My mother’s defense was “if his father gave it to him, he also taught him how to use it safely” As CFIs, do we teach pilots the “least common denominator solution”? or can we risk “sharp tools” and teach judgment with the inevitable danger of misuse? I think every pilot (and CFI) has to decide this question for themselves, but we certainly want to carefully examine all available options.

So let’s freeze our airplane and pilot at that “point of decision” when our engine coughs and goes silent on takeoff; CRAP, THIS IS BAD! Imagine yourself in this situation. These failures are usually powerplant (89%) and statistically catastrophic, though often avoidable (fuel mismanagement 38.8%).  So step one is more careful preparation before advancing the throttle on takeoff to eliminate ever having to choose a solution in the air. Step two is being contantly vigilant on every takeoff so we are ready if we have to suddently “do that pilot stuff”.

Once in this “awkward agl,” power failure situation, only one thing is certain; we will be on the ground in about a minute-either as a falling object or in a successful outcome. Comparing straight ahead with turning back is statistically difficult since successful turn-backs are seldom recorded. What we *do* know is that only 4.8% of emergency off-field landings are fatal and in 83% there are “little or no injuries.” (from the excellent Rod Machado emergency programs). Straight ahead at best glide with slight turns is a remarkably good solution. It is also important to remember at this point of decision “the insurance company owns the plane” and your primary goal is to save yourself, your passengers and minimize any threat to people on the ground. Another solid fact is that if you attempt a turn-back and screw it up, this loss of control will almost certainly be a fatal stall/spin ending.

But pilots *do* regularly complete this tricky emergency maneuver and turn back successfully; that is what we will discuss this Thursday. Glider pilots are required to perform this maneuver on every checkride. My previous 135 training in the PC-12 required a turn around to be demonstrated ever 6 months our regular ATP checkride. What would I personally do at this “point of decision” and what should I teach this as a CFI? (my personal score is currently 2 and 2 in 48 years of flying) The successful execution entirely depends on altitude, preparation, proficiency and the context of wind and geometry for each unique runway situation. If you have *not* carefully evaluated and prebriefed this maneuver and also practiced it at altitude, absolutely land straight ahead with slight turns to a hopeful landing. In the 135 flying world, standard operating procedures requires that before every takeoff  we precisely brief all our options; straight ahead and turnback altitude. This includes who will fly, when and which way to turn back; also who works the radios and where to land. (At most urban airfields there are also few open areas.)

Join us Thursday, there is lots more to discuss, but on every takeoff please do your homework and make your decision *before* takeoff. Also always exercise extreme vigilance as you advance that throttle for takeoff. We know this is a statistically a very dangerous time (24% of fatal accidents). Though flying is fun we also have the huge responsibility of managing risks.


Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles. Write us a comment if you see a problem or want to contribute an article. We are always seeking more input on aviation improvements and flight safety. There are many highly qualified aviation educators out there! If you are not yet a SAFE member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun. Lastly, use our FREE SAFE Toolkit App to put pilot endorsements and experience requirements right on your smart phone and facilitate CFI+DPE teamwork. Working together we make safer pilots!

 

Impossible or “Improbable” Turn?

How can something as simple as takeoff and climb-out be responsible for 24% of fatal GA aviation accidents? According to NTSB data, this is the most fatal phase of flight. Perhaps it’s the very non-threatening appearance of this maneuver (“hard to miss the sky…”) that causes pilots to under-appreciate the risks, and fail to prepare thoroughly? Some simple preparation and vigilance in this area of flight can yield a big payback in your safety.

Join us on February 8th for a livestream called “The Improbable Turn” with Rod Machado. We will examine the entire takeoff/climb-out process and talk about the sometimes controversial idea of turning back in the case of an engine failure. This show is interactive (thanks to our friends at Gold SealGround Schools). Your input is encouraged (as are comments below). If anyone can shed light (and avoid argument) on this issue it is Rod Machado with his vast experience and also nuanced understanding of pilot psychology. If you register with the FAA for Master Wings credit, you will also have a chance to win a Zulu 3 Headset generously donated by Lightspeed for this show!


FAA Glider Flying Handbook

My formal introduction to the “impossible turn” was during glider training. In the soaring world, on every takeoff, a pilot is required to call out “200 feet.” If a tow rope breaks above this magic altitude, a pilot executes a  turnback to land on the departing runway (conditions permitting). This turnback maneuver is required in all the training courses. During flight training, a glider student will absolutely expect their CFI to pull the tow release (same as loss of power) frequently. The procedure is 45 degrees of bank at approach speed-to lessen the radius of turn. This becomes a pretty “normal” maneuver for a current glider pilot.

For a power pilot that has not practiced (or even seen) this maneuver, turning back to the runway is a very bad idea. The risks are especially escalated if the pilot has not done a “pre-takeoff-brief of expected emergency actions” or the maneuver is precipitated by an unreasonable effort to “save the aircraft.” Remember, this is a pretty extreme maneuver very close to the ground. Airspeed, coordination and judgment of drift are all critical for success here with little room for error. Remember also, it requires more like 270 degrees of total turning to get back over the runway and lined up. Add to this a downwind landing (perhaps with less than full flaps) and you have a recipe for disaster.

This is why the common wisdom has defined this maneuver as “the impossible turn” and recommends landing straight ahead if your engine fails. Find a clearing and miss the big things, touching down as slowly as possible with the fuel, power and electrics off. The statistics on surviving this maneuver are very good if a pilot is mentally rehearsed in the procedure and you avoid hitting hard objects.

The real “lightning rod” question is “are there cases where a return to the airport is a reasonable choice?” One of my aviation heroes, Barry Schiff speculates a turn back can be a viable option as does Rod Machado-but only in certain well-defined cases.  The AOPA has a program dedicated to this question. It is certainly a question every pilot should answer for themselves in case they encounter this challenge. Please join us for that discussion.

The [critical] difference between success and failure is not only having sufficient altitude, but knowing how and when the turnaround maneuver can be performed with relative safety [and being pre-briefed-“locked and loaded”-for this eventuality].

Register with the FAA Safety website (for WIngs *and* you might win a headset) and join us at GoldSealFebruary 8th so we can all share our experiences and hopefully develop a personal plan that is comfortable and assures greater safety on takeoff and climb out. More next week!


Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles. Write us a comment if you see a problem or want to contribute an article. We are always seeking more input on aviation improvements and flight safety. There are many highly qualified aviation educators out there! If you are not yet a SAFE member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun. Lastly, use our FREE SAFE Toolkit App to put pilot endorsements and experience requirements right on your smart phone and facilitate CFI+DPE teamwork. Working together we make safer pilots!

I Wish All Emergencies Ended This Well!

This is the ninth anniversary of the “Miracle on the Hudson”.  And though this was an amazing demonstration of cool decision-making and piloting skill, the pilots, Chesley Sullenberger and Jeffrey Skiles were completely overwhelmed by the national media attention and their sudden fame. They repeatedly emphasized they were just “pilots doing our job” (humble always trumps hubris). And while it is true every professional pilot is trained continuously in Crew Resource Management and also generating successful outcomes in emergencies, we all can continually draw golden lessons from this amazing historic flight; here are a few thoughts.

What happens over time is we tend to forget how badly this situation could have ended. Remember the ugly Colgin crash that followed soon after Sully or the Air France 447? This highlights the amazing constellation of luck and skill that made the “Miracle on the Hudson” all work out. Here are three very important pitfalls to avoid in every emergency and some techniques to “prepare” for surprise occurrences.

The major obstacle to effective action in every emergency is the startle/surprise incapacitation. This is when our mental circuit breaker trips off line and the human psychology says “why me?” or “this can’t be happening.” Even the most prepared and experienced pilot is going to have a moment of inaction, but we have to reboot and get functioning ASAP.  Step one in every emergency has to be “fly the plane; then analyze, engage and work the problem.”  Using a checklist and standard operating procedures is essential to get your mind functioning and back to work. This requires resilience, grit or emotional fortitude and as pilots, we work hard to develop and maintain these qualities. The best antidote to surprise/startle incapacitation is maintaining constant mental alertness in flight (especially at critical phases of flight). If we can maintain alert awareness and try continuously to “expect the unexpected” (Marines call “code yellow”) it is less likely that surprise will overwhelm us in these situations. (Watch for our upcoming LiveStream with Rod Machado on “The Improbable Turn”)

A second common problem in emergencies is being rendered ineffective by trying to achieve a “perfect” outcome. In business decision this is called “overfitting.” The unique and endlessly variety of possible emergencies almost precludes a “textbook solution.” This is a time for a TLAR (that looks about right) solution; a time for inginuity and getting the “best of the worst.” Once we accept and engage the emergency situation, it is essential to remain flexible, and use as many resources as possible to share the cognitive load (so we are not “swimming in glue”) and creatively visualize the outcome we need to survive; optimize. This technique is called “satisficing” and it means getting as much as you can of the required parameters while accepting the outcome that will not be perfect. (Check out the amazing Nobel Laureate Herb Simon and heuristic decisions; when time, resources and processing power are limited)

A last major failing in emergencies almost follows directly from the previous advice of soliciting resources. We can get so much help and so many good ideas that this confuses the situation and dissipates effective, decisive action. Think of all the runways Sully was offered in those 208 seconds of glide. There are either too many contrary solutions or just plain bad advice. In an emergency you have to aggressively assert command authority at some point and decide on a course of action and commit to the plan “we’re going in the Hudson” If you waffle on KLGA and KTEB as options, you ruin your glide and miss the river. “I really would prefer a runway” (the perfect solution) but a large flat area without combustible materials will have to do ( “satisficing” )  As pilots we can all rejoice at this wonderful example of piloting skill and decision-making. Hopefully we all can model some good lessons for future challenges; watch out for geese!


Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles. Write us a comment if you see a problem or want to contribute an article. We are always seeking more input on aviation improvements and flight safety. There are many highly qualified aviation educators out there! If you are not yet a SAFE member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun. Lastly, use our FREE SAFE Toolkit App to put pilot endorsements and experience requirements right on your smart phone and facilitate CFI+DPE teamwork. Working together we make safer pilots!

“Broadband Speed” For Your Brain!

When you witness an amazingly skillful performance, whether it is an Olympic gymnast, a violin concerto or world-class aerobatic flying, the real process at work is the human brain functioning at its peak. The secret to acquiring and sustaining this level of technical perfection is revealed in a fascinating book; The Talent Code. Author Daniel Coyle is a very engaging writer and repeatedly demonstrates the essence of masterful instruction and performance across a spectrum of diverse pursuits–from Brazilian soccer to world-class musicians. (As a treat for pilots, Coyle also pays homage to the value of the original Link Aviation Flight Simulator).

In one ramshackle little gymnasium outside Moscow, The Spartak Tennis Club, talented coaches have created more world-class tennis stars in the last 20 years than in the whole USA. In a similar spartan Adirondack music camp, master instructors taught Yo-Yo Ma,  Pinchas Zuckerman and a host of other world-class musicians. Using these examples and many others, Coyle distills the essence of how amazing education really works, and how to turbocharge your learning. It’s also great news for every aspiring aviator that “talent” is more “how you learn” than genetic destiny. I highly recommend this short and exciting book to every flight educator.

In summary, as mentioned in a previous blog article about “Peak” , Anders Ericsson’s study of master performers, high motivation and a special deep practice are always necessary (no magic bullet here). But most interesting, it is the kind of practice necessary to create faster and better performance. To learn (or teach) rapid skill acquisition at a master level, it is essential to practice outside your comfort zone. Practicing in this “struggle zone” and working relentlessly toward a well defined goal builds skills six times faster than usual techniques. Simple repetition of what you already know is wasted time. Many other techniques Coyle reveals, like chunking and reframing, are also involved also in this fast-track skill development.

A key point of the Talent Code is that specialized practice techniques, in a wide variety of fields, lead to the formation in the brain of an insulating neurological substance called myelin. Much like insulation on an electrical wire, myelin wraps the carefully created skill pathways and creates “mental broadband.”  Master performances using these amazing myelinated pathways that are 3,000 times faster than the usual brain circuits. Deliberate, correct practice, outside your comfort zone creates greater technical mastery in a shorter time with better retention–the true secret to exceptional learning and performance.

Struggle is not optional—it’s neurologically required: in order to get your skill circuit to fire optimally, you must by definition fire the circuit suboptimally; you must make mistakes and pay attention to those mistakes; you must slowly teach your circuit. You must also keep firing that circuit—i.e., practicing—in order to [build and] keep myelin functioning properly

As far as the educators inspiring to provide this “turbo learning,” Coyle calls them “talent whisperers.” Usually  quiet and offering minimal and very precise direction, there are many useful tips in Coyle’s book for educators about creating technical mastery.

Please join us this Thursday. SAFE will be presenting a follow up “Drill Down on LOC-I” with Patty Wagstaff and Rich Stowell on-line to further define skills and techniques to combat Loss of Control. The previous seminar is available as a YouTube (complete the Quiz also if you want FAA Master Wings Credit). Please sign up on-line at FAAsafety.gov and see you Thursday, Dec 14th at 8 EDT.


Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles. Write us a comment if you see a problem or want to contribute an article. We are always seeking more input on aviation improvements and flight safety. There are many highly qualified aviation educators out there! If you are not yet a SAFE member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun. Lastly, use our FREE SAFE Toolkit App to put pilot endorsements and experience requirements right on your smart phone and facilitate CFI+DPE teamwork. Working together we make safer pilots!

Prevent LOC-I; Please Train Turning Stalls!

We had great attendance for our national LiveStream with Patty Wagstaff and Rich Stowell; thank-you all for watching. You can watch (and share) it [here] Once again, however, I am amazed at the number of pilots (and CFIs) who have limited understanding of the aerodynamics of turns. Pilots on some deep level seem misunderstand and fear banking. We need to elevate our game to avoid LOC-I accidents. Training turning stalls (at a safe altitude please) is an effective way to build confidence and understanding.

In a stable, coordinated turn (level, climbing or descending), the lift on the wings is equal! Obviously, there was unequal lift while rolling the plane into the turn, but when it is established and coordinated, lift on the wings is equal. If you reduce power and decellerate to a stall, it’s no big deal, the nose falls away from the lift vector. For the CFI this is a very powerful and useful demonstration (and an effective teachable moment). I guarantee your student (who should already be comfortable with level stalls to be ready for this) will grab the seat and expect a spin (even though you already explained it all). This is a misunderstanding due to the flight attitude. The usual airplane reaction to this stall is a mushing motion away from the lift vector. Most pilots are surprised at the lack of a sharp stall break and fail to even identify the stalled condition! These “teachable moments” are critical in the flight training process to create safe pilots.

Remember; the turning stall maneuver is also available to be tested on both the Private and Commercial flight tests. I also have had flight test applicants refuse to slip to land because it’s “dangerous” (and yes…that’s also on the FAA test) so I wrote this article to clear up this misunderstanding.


Here is some more stall information from SAFE member Robert Reser; “How To Fly A Plane”

—INADVERTENT STALL

Stalling an aircraft requires pitching the nose to the critical angle-of-attack. Remember, exceeding the critical angle-of-attack is when stall occurs. The aircraft being pitched to an attitude that reaches the critical angle-of-attack causes the stall! There are only two possible ways to cause the nose to reach the critical angle-of-attack in a positive stable aircraft.

  1. Pulling and holding the elevator aft…the pilot causes stall.
  2. In descent trimming nose up to a very slow indicated-airspeed at reduced power, then increasing power causing thrust component-lift which could add back enough pitch trim effect to reach the critical angle-of-attack…the pilot causes stall.

There are only two ways an aircraft can pitch to the critical angle-of-attack. One is for the pilot to pull and hold the elevator aft. The second is for the pilot to input a large nose up elevator trim when at a low thrust setting then add lots of thrust…again pilot induced.

It might be easier to understand if the pilot realizes the only thing the elevator ever does is allow change of indicated air-speed with angle-of-attack change. Also when operating at reduced thrust of descent, any increase of thrust increases angle-of-attack until in level or climbing flight.

It is difficult to see that in minimum indicated-airspeed descending flight, adding power can cause stall. The fact remains it can happen. In descent, there is a substantial reduction of thrust component-lift normally contributing to angle-of-attack. To compensate, and for maintaining the slowed constant indicated-airspeed, added aft-elevator control and/or nose-up elevator trim maintains the desired angle-of-attack.

If a slowed, hands-off level flight is operating at 12-degrees angle-of-attack, the corresponding thrust component-lift is contributing as much as 6-degrees to that angle.

Reducing to idle thrust removes 4-5 degrees of that angle-of-attack contributed by thrust component-lift, so allows acceleration. It requires adding aft-elevator or additional nose-up elevator trim to maintain the original constant indicated-airspeed in this descent.

Now the stabilizer is contributing 10-11 degrees of the angle-of-attack. Adding back the thrust toward a level sustaining setting is adding nose-up pitch to the trim as much as 8-10 degrees, so without forward elevator input can cause immediate stall.

—LOW INDICATED-AIRSPEED AND APPROACH STALL

All low indicated-airspeed maneuvering flight is subject to inadvertent stall. A turn when in a slow indicated-airspeed situation if requiring added power, while already holding the control wheel aft for altitude control, can potentially cause immediate stall.

When in a descending steep turn at reduced thrust with the elevator trimmed for very slow indicated-airspeed flight, the aircraft can be at a 12 to 14-degree angle-of-attack. Added thrust for reducing descent rate or leveling will cause considerable thrust component-lift, adding as much as a 6 to 10-degrees angle-of-attack…immediate stall…it requires coordinated forward elevator control to avoid attaining critical angle-of-attack.

A common condition where this occurs is the base to final VFR approach when overshooting the extended centerline. A pilot already in the trimmed, low-powered, landing configured slow-flight tends to increase the bank attitude and simultaneously pull the elevator attempting to correct back toward the extended centerline.

The increased bank reduces vertical lift and any added aft elevator causes more slowing from the added angle-of-attack plus increased “g” force. At this point, a power increase adding those 4-5 degrees to the angle-of-attack may cause immediate low altitude stall with no altitude for recovery.

Low altitude, slow indicated-airspeed flight maneuvering must be with minimum or no manual aft elevator input. There must be anticipation of applying forward elevator prior to or while adding thrust in this condition.

A pilot must understand how thrust component-lift affects flight. All flight instruction of normal level turns should be without elevator input but with coordination of added thrust for its thrust component-lift.

Descending turns use gravity component-thrust so for constant indicated-airspeed must increase descent rate during the turn. It is impossible visually ascertaining a steep nose-up attitude when descending but anytime using aft elevator, the increased angle-of-attack reduces indicated-airspeed.

In slow indicated-airspeed maneuvering, always expect stall indication and if occurring, immediate forward elevator toward zero “g” with coordinated rudder and aileron leveling the wings for maximum vertical lifting.

In all flight, always trim to a hands-off condition with aircraft controls. “You will be surprised how the airplane just wants to do its thing without all the fussing with the control wheel”.

—TAKEOFF AND GO-AROUND STALL

Takeoff and go-arounds are situations where slow indicated-airspeeds are transitioning into both increasing indicated-airspeed and altitude. Without using hands-off techniques for flight, a pilot will be manually holding aft elevator control for angle-of-attack. Inadvertent increased aft elevator input can easily lead to stall.

With the go-arounds, there is transition from trimmed slow indicated-airspeed descent to leveling for acceleration and then climb. In this case the added thrust alone adds back nose up pitch increasing the aircraft angle-of-attack trim to level flight and then any excess thrust continues pitching to a climb angle with increased altitude. Any added manual aft elevator initially added to stop descent can lead to stall.

These situations require specific training in awareness of what is happening and again knowing hands-off flight control techniques. A go-around should allow acceleration while leveling and then climb. The aircraft is already flying; it seldom requires immediately jamming lots of thrust.

In all cases, a trimmed hands-off aircraft cannot stall. The elevator sets angle-of-attack and only if at a descending power setting will that change and then with thrust change. Just don’t pull the control wheel!

For a free .pdf version of Bob’s book, “How to Fly Airplanes” e-book send an e-mail to Bob with “e-book” as subject!


Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles. Write us a comment if you see a problem or want to contribute an article. We are always seeking more input on aviation improvements and flight safety. There are many highly qualified aviation educators out there! If you are not yet a SAFE member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun. Lastly, use our FREE SAFE Toolkit App to put pilot endorsements and experience requirements right on your smart phone and facilitate CFI+DPE teamwork. Working together we make safer pilots!

To Err is Human! “NASA Form”

by Parvez Dara, ATP, MCFII, MEI (and our SAFE Treasurer)

Did you make a mistake today? If you said no. I would beg to differ. We make tiny errors in our daily lives that go unnoticed all the time because they are mostly isolated and of little consequence. The adage is “To err is human.” And to err is universal and seemingly inevitable also.  But here is the hard question, “Are mistakes always a bad thing?”

To answer that question, we may have to ride the train backwards in time. During WWII planes were falling from the sky. More lives were lost from mistakes than from enemy aircraft shoot-downs.

We obviously learned from those mistakes. The total fatal aircraft accident rate in the United States declined dramatically over time from 1959 when the fatal accident rate was 1 in 100,000. As 2016 became history the fatal commercial aircraft accident rate declined to an astonishingly low rate of 1 per 10 million flights. Imagine the log reduction in loss of life! A proof worth hanging your hat on. Education about Loss of Control, Fuel Management, Decision Making and Judgement were the important improvements to bring the number down. Yet if we were to look at airline safety data from 2009 (without jinxing anything) there has been a zero-accident rate in the seven-year period. That is incredible!

The General Aviation Accident Rate per year however is a different story. It is presented below and is based on the NTSB data available to date. The higher rate of fatal accidents in the general Aviation Community is partly because of lack of professionalism, single pilot operations and the “bold pilot” mode of thinking.

YEARS GA Accident Rate/100,000 GA Fatal Accidents GA Fatalities
FY10 1.1 272 471
FY11 1.12 278 469
FY12 1.09 267 442
FY13 1.11 259 449
FY14 1.09 252 435
FY15 0.99 238 384
FY16 0.91 219 413

So, let me get back to the issue of is “To Err” a bad thing?

The answer is a qualified NO. However, with a caveat, to repeat an error made by others, which has been used as a learning event, is definitely a bad thing. It is important to know that the NTSB data was created out of bent metal and loss of life. Errors made by expanding the envelope of flight teach us what not to do. Though it’s never easy to admit these mistakes, “fessing up” is a crucial step in learning, growing, and improving.  The FAA rules are created based on the NTSB information for pilot’s personal and his or her passenger’s safety and based mostly on the erroneous adventures of others.

The FAA has in place a NASA form just for this purpose. If you make a mistake or believe you might have, it is important to fill out the form and send it along for record keeping. The form is evaluated based on ATC tracking data and if no intentional errors were made, the pilot receives a response in kind. If however, there was an error committed, the pilot has protection by self-reporting of the error. This is the whole basis for a Safety Management System. A pilot is forgiven for any errors committed over a three-year period. A continuous flow of errors however point to the pilot’s competency and decision making that might require a rehabilitation and remediation strategy. Read the monthly intake here.

Electronic submission here, ASRS Form available below

https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/general.pdf

Assuming you are in a hurry and wish to fly for a $100 hamburger with impatient passengers tapping their toes. Allowing them to influence your preflight decisions to not drain the fuel or check the oil content, hazards will loom in that flight. These risks may remain only as risks and not bite you or your passengers, but the “kick the tire and light the fire” does have adverse consequences if repeated. And one day, when all the gremlins go for their “Labor Day vacation” watchout! Latest “Callback” Newsletter

Based on the FAA Fact Sheet

The Top 10 Leading Causes of Fatal General Aviation Accidents 2001-2013: 

  1. Loss of Control Inflight (see recent SAFE Livestream!)
    2. Controlled Flight into Terrain
    3. System Component Failure – Powerplant
    4. Fuel Related – contamination, starvation or exhaustion
    5. Unknown or Undetermined
    6. System Component Failure – Non-Powerplant
    7. Unintended Flight in IMC
    8. Midair Collisions Low
    9. Altitude Operations
    10. Other

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles. Write us a comment if you see a problem or want to contribute an article. We are always seeking more input on aviation improvements and flight safety. There are many highly qualified aviation educators out there! If you are not yet a SAFE member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun. Lastly, use our FREE SAFE Toolkit App to put pilot endorsements and experience requirements right on your smart phone and facilitate CFI+DPE teamwork. Working together we make safer pilots!

 

Aviation Safety; We Can Do Better!

My condolences to the family of Roy Halladay, by all accounts a talented and generous person with so much potential. Not only has the world lost this amazing person, but aviation has suffered another very public black eye with the repeating question “How can this happen?” From what has become available so far, there seems to be some avoidable risks in the recent Icon A5 crash that could have been mitigated.

Identifying and mitigating risks is the essence of aviation safety and this includes the psychological discipline of saying NO to “having too much fun”. Exercising “executive function” and knowing where and when *not* to fly is critical to safety. (See Dr. Bill Rhodes “Pilots Who Should Scare Us”) Maintaining adequate altitude in the cruise phase of flight is one of our critical margins of safety as pilots. Low level maneuvering flight (below 1000 feet) usually comprises only 15% of our exposure as pilots but is where over 70% of fatalities occur. Loss of control accidents are disproportionately represented in this phase of flight. If you add intentional radical maneuvers this only asks for trouble. This type of demonstration flying, though exciting, requires a highly trained professional pilot and a aerodynamically robust high-G machine. This precise and demanding flying should be left to airshow pros! There is no way a new pilot should be flying an LSA in this manner.

And as Steve Pope of Flying Magazine has pointed out, marketing this kind of low level “yank and bank” flying as an obtainable and safe activity is scary to many veteran pilots.

Pope said “the plane itself is great,” but he had concerns about Halladay, a new pilot with little flying time, taking the craft out over water at low altitude, though the plane was marketed as a craft that could do that.

“They still think that that’s the way the airplane should be flown, and there are people in aviation who completely disagree with that,” Pope said. “They think you should not have a low-time pilot flying low over water. That’s a recipe for disaster.”

This kind of behavior in the hands of new pilots will certainly lead to more accidents. We will be talking about the aerodynamics and psychology of loss of control (LOC-I) this Thursday the 16th at 8PM EST with aerobatic champion Patty Wagstaff and upset training specialist Rich Stowell. This livestream is presented by the FAA and qualifies participants for FAA Master Wings. As an additional incentive, our generous sponsors at Lightspeed Aviation are providing a Zulu 3 headset to be offered to a random winner at the end of the show; please join us.

Please “follow” our SAFE blog to receive notification of new articles. Write us a comment if you see a problem or want to contribute an article. We are always seeking more input on aviation improvements and flight safety. There are many highly qualified aviation educators out there! If you are not yet a SAFE member, please Join SAFE and support our mission of generating aviation excellence in teaching and flying. Our amazing member benefits alone make this commitment worthwhile and fun. Lastly, use our FREE SAFE Toolkit App to put pilot endorsements and experience requirements right on your smart phone and facilitate CFI+DPE teamwork. Working together we make safer pilots!